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STUDY OF INTERMITTENT FIELD 
HARDWARE FAILURE DATA IN DIGITAL ELECTRONICS 
Edward J. O'Neill and James R. Halverson 
Sperry Univac 
1.0 Summary 
Under this contract (NASA Contract NAS 1-15574) Sperry Univac 
was asked to investigate their data recording and retrieval 
system for failures of an intermittent nature that occurred in 
field operation. Due to the nature of an intermittent problem 
and the reporting of the problem being at the discretion of the 
user, data referring to the first manifestation of an intermittent 
failure is not available. However, Sperry Univac developed a list 
of failure mechanisms that could manifest themselves as intermit-
tents. This list was used to retrieve, from the data system, 
those failures and their times that could be the final manifesta-
tion of a previously intermittent problem. 
Three time periods were studied and probability functions were 
fitted and tested for goodness of fit to the data of intermittent 
and potentially intermittent failures. This was done for the 
computer and for the SSI digital microcircuit components. 
Results show that the exponential model of time to intermittent 
failure is adequate for the microcircuits. However, the Weibull 
distribution gives a slightly more accurate fit in some time 
periods. The results from the different time periods indicates 
that the failure rate for intermittents increases as the age of 
the microcircuits increases. However, it is felt that the 
further investigation of larger time periods is necessary to 
confirm the results indicated in this study. 
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2.0 Introduction 
2.1 Introduction 
Intermittent hardware failures are known to have an important 
impact on the reliability of digital systems. However, accurate 
intermittent failure models of the type required to make realis-
tic reliability assessments are not readily available. This 
study makes available a data base of intermittent failure in-
formation, based on field failure data, which were classified 
by failure mechanisms and their likelihood of having been inter-
mittent (quasi-intermittent). 
This study will direct its attention toward actual failures that 
occurred in field-installed hardware and were introduced into our 
failure analysis cycle. This approach, while limited in the 
total population of failures, provides a new data base of quasi-
intermittent failure data for possible application to future 
reliability assessments. 
2.2 Study Objective 
The objective of this study is to develop a data base of informa-
tion, based on available field failure data, for intermittent 
digital hardware failures. 
2.3 Study Plan 
To meet this objective this study will i) define the problem of 
intermittent failure, ii) describe Sperry Univac's data recording 
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and retrieval system, iii) study the problem at the computer 
level and iv) study the problem at the micro circuit-device level . 
• 
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3.0 Study Definition 
3.1 Intermittent Definition 
An intermittent is defined as a detected malfunction of a logic 
net which was operating properly prior to the malfunction and 
resumes normal operation in less time than the time needed to isolate 
the malfunctioning net to the lowest replaceable unit (LRU). 
In presently deployed computers, the time to isolate is of 
critical importance~ that is, the time for the maintenance tech-
nicianor the Built-in-Test (BIT) logic to find the problem and replace 
the component. 
The impact of the duration of intermittency of any given mal-
function and its frequency are dependent on the system archi-
tecture, software, and maintenance tools. 
In older systems, and to some extent the systems of today, the 
intermittent was always detected by the operating software. 
The maintenance technician was then called and by utilizing 
his tools, i.e., test programs, scope, VOM, etc., he was ex-
pected to recreate the detection scenario and isolate the problem 
to some LRU. In this case, any intermittent with a duration of 
less than, say, 30 minutes, would not be isolated and would be 
declared an intermittent thus remaining in the system to cause 
trouble when it again fails. 
In some present day equipment and potentially most new equip-
ment, the task of both intermittent malfunction detection and 
isolation will fall upon BIT. If BIT were designed to 
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constantly monitor all logic nets, the detection and 
isolation of malfunction would occur almost instantaneously. 
This would mean that only malfunctions having a duration of a 
few nano-seconds would be classified as intermittent. 
The definition of the duration of an intermittent has been specific-
ally bounded by malfunction isolation time. This is due to the 
assumption that once the malfunction has been isolated and, con-
sequently, removed from the system, the fact that the replaced 
item may once again resume normal operation is of no consequence 
to the system operation. This does, however, pose a significant 
problem for the failure analysis task. 
3.2 Constraints on the Study 
Historically, Sperry pnivac has not maintained a data base of 
intermittent malfunctions. This is due to the following 
reasons: 
Most of Sperry Univac's exposure to the system is that 
of equipment checkout. Once the equipment is running 
properly, it is delivered to the customer. The check-
out time is but a small fraction of the total system 
life cycle and, as such, the quantity of intermittent 
failures experienced is very minute. Only with the 
advent of such activities as the 1000 hour burn-in 
testing, has the quantity of intermittents and the re-
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porting structure been sufficient to justify the record-
ing of intermittent malfunction data. 
The field failure reporting has been at the customers' 
discretion. The failure data reported from the field 
is made up almost exclusively of hard failures. Due 
to the complex nature of customer operational software 
and customer hardware configurations, of which Sperry 
Univac normally provides only the computer, it is most 
likely that intermittent failures (particularly those 
with long time between manifestations) are rarely iso-
lated and consequently not reported in the field unless 
they become hard or their frequency increases to the point 
where they appear hard. 
Due to the lack of data on isolated intermittent failures as 
explained above, the only method of arriving at a data base 
pertaining to intermittent failures was to examine the reported 
hard failures and decide which failure mechanisms could manifest 
themselves as intermittents. This decision was arrived at by a 
joint effort by engineering personnel from the Sperry Univac 
Product Reliability Department and Failure Analysis Laboratory. 
Each failure mechanism was examined and placed in one of the 
following categories based on the best judgement of the above 
mentioned departments: 
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Intermittent - A relatively high possibility of 
causing intermittent hardware failure. 
Potential Intermittent - Some possibility of causing 
intermittent hardware failure. 
Hard Failure - Little possibility of causing inter-
mittent hardware failure. 
Due to the lack of empirical data, the above failure cate-
gorization was accomplished by engineering judgement. Confi-
dence in this categorization will be maintained until data is 
available to either confirm or reject any of these judgements. 
Due to these constraints and the data base that was 
available for this study, all reporting and analysis of 
failures in this study are on field failures after they became 
hard. 
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4.0 Description of Sperry Univac's Failure 
Reporting System 
4.1 Fail Codes 
In Sperry Univac's failure reporting system there are 174 fail 
codes used to describe the failure mechanism. These refer to 
failures of an electrical, magnetic, electro-magnetic, and 
mechanical nature. Of these 174 codes, 43 are not applicable 
to this study, 86 would be considered "hard", 28 are considered 
potentially intermittent, and 17 are considered intermittent 
according to the definition of these classes in 3.2. A brief 
description of the codes that were intermittent or potentially 
intermittent are given in Figures 1-5. 
Some contracts on individual computers call for the reporting of 
field equipment utilization, failure reporting, and failure 
analysis. The data on these computers goes into Sperry Univac's 
failure reporting system. 
4.2 Reporting Forms 
The sources of the data for this study utilized three reporting 
forms. The first is an "Equipment Utilization Report". (See 
Appendix A.l.) This report is filled out monthly for each equip-
ment that is participating in the utilization reporting program. 
This report is used even if the equipment does not experience any 
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Fail 
Code 
IOD 
POTENTIALLY INTERMITTE~T 
Description 
Broken Weld: possible intermittent operation resulting from 
partial contact of wire to pad. 
IIF - Smeared Open Chip Bond: possible intermittent failure re-
sulting from partial electrical contact of the lead wire to 
the bond pad or bond to adjacent metal. 
IIG - Smeared Open Post Bond: possible intermittent failure re-
sulting from partial electrical contact of the lead wire to 
the bonding post. 
IlL - Bond Short to Metallization or Chip Edge or Mislocated: 
possible intermittent operation caused by partial shorting 
of the wire bond to metal interconnects or adjacent bond 
pads. 
12G - Interlayer Metal Short: possi~le intermittent operation 
resulting from partial shorting of metal interconnects (used 
for multi layer metal devices). 
13C - Cracked Die: possible intermittent failure resulting from 
partial electrical contact of the parts of the semiconductor 
die. 
15A - Out of Spec(Elect): possible intermittent operation result-
ing from out of specification electrical parameters: this 
is dependent upon operating design margins. 
15E - Slow Recovery: possible intermittent operation caused by 
slow reverse recovery (Trr) of diodes: this is dependent upon 
the design operating·margins. 
lSF - Core Cracked/Defective/Noisy: possible intermittent operatfon 
caused by cracked/defective/noisy cores resulting in bits 
being "picked" or dropped. 
Figure 1 
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POTENTIALLY INTERMITTENT (continued) 
l5G - Early Peaking Core: possible intermittent operation caused 
by an early loss of core signal out,put: this is dependent 
upon the design operating margins. 
20K - Timing - Delay Line Taps: possible intermittent operation 
caused by out of specification timing adjustment of delay 
line. 
2lA - Delay Time: possible intermittent operation caused by out 
of specification delay time of printed circuit assemblies or 
subassemblies. 
2lL - Low Output: possible intermittent operation caused by an 
output signal which does not achieve the specified output 
level. 
21M - Magnetostriction: possible intermittent operation caused by 
a change in electrical characteristics (e.g. ringing) ofa 
core caused by excessive external pressur~. 
22H - Not Verified, Elect cause unknown 
22J - Not Verified, Elect plating anomolies 
22K - Not Verified, Elect restriction of wire 
22L - Not Verified, Elect scratch/abrasion 
22M Not Verified, Elect bond 
22N - Not Verified, Elect corrosion 
22P -
220 -
Not Verified, Elect substrate defects 
Not Verified, Elect nonrestrict foreign material 
Failures with the above fail codes could be considered to 
cause possible intermittent operation since a failure was 
experienced for which no cause could be determined but 0r:ly 
suspected. 
23B - Noisy Bit: possible intermittent operation caused by excessive 
noise, ringing, excessive recovery, or impedance mismatch of 
a core or film output signal. 
Figure 2 
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POTENTIALLY INTERMITTENT (continued) 
23K - Weak Bit: possible intermittent operation caused by a 
narrow output pulse or an output level below that for system 
operation (::ce 2lL). 
3lA Unverified failure 
3lC - No defect found by failed item analysis 
3lH - Unverified failure/suspect part replaced 
3lJ - Scrap-unvl'r if ied failure 
Failures within the above codes could cause intermittent 
operation since a failure did exist which could not be veri-
fied through failure isolation •. 
Figure 3 
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INTERMITTENT . 
lOG - Shorted Lead Wire, Poor Lead Dress: intermittent .shorting 
to the edge of the die or adjacent wire bonds. 
10L - Internal Particle or Contamination: intermittent shorting 
between die metallization stripes, bonding pones/wires or 
edge of die to package. 
ION - Lead or Metal Migration (Grow Back): intermittent contact 
of metal links, originally fused to create an open (logic 
"1"); this is used primarily for PROM's with fused li~. 10: 
technology. 
lID - Plagued Open Chip Bond: 
lIE - Plagued Open Post Bond: intermittent open of the chip or 
post bond resulting from the formation of "purple-plague" 
in Au-AI intermetallic systems. 
llH - Underbonded Chip Bond: 
llJ - Under bonded Post Bond: intermittent open of the chip or 
post bond resulting from inadequate ultrasonic bonding 
in~erface in AI-AI systems. 
l2B - Open Metallization Due to Microcrack: intermittent open 
of metallization stripes, primarily over ohmic steps, 
resulting from discontinuous (cracked) metallization. 
12C - Open Metal Electromigration: intermittent open metallization 
due to migration within thin areas of metal stripes caused 
primarily a combination of excessive current density/tempera-
ture. 
15M - Pattern Sensitive: intermittent logic failure resulting from 
a particular pattern within memory causing an undesired 
change of memory bit (primarily used for RAM's). 
20B - Bent, Broken or Pushed in Pins: intermittent open contacts 
resulting from damged connector pins. 
Figure 4 12 
INTERMITTENT (continued) 
20C - Cold Flow, Abraded or Damaged Wire Insulation: intermittent 
shorting resulting from damaged wire insulation causing 
shorts to adjacent connector pins, wires, terminals or ground. 
20F - Warped, Splitting, Uneven Mat Area: intermittent electrical 
failure caused by a change of magnetic core characteristics 
or core damage resulting from warpe~, split or uneven core 
mat. 
2lG - Damaged Foil: intermittent open caused by raised or damaged 
metallic interconnects (foil) on a printed circuit card. 
23G - Disturb: intermittent logic failure" within memory resulting 
during a READ or WRITE cycle at one location causing another 
location to change states. 
30H - Reseated Cards: intermittent failure resulting from linpro-
perly or unseated printed circuit cards causing intermittent 
connection. 
3lD - Intermittent/Cause Unknown: intermittent computer, assembly 
or sub-assembly failure experienced for which no specific 
cause could be established. 
Figure 5 
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failures. When a computer, which is covered by this report-
ing system experiences a failure and the failure results in 
a repair, it is reported on either a, "Failure/Malfunctional 
Report" (FMR) , or an "Equipment Malfunction Report" (EMR). 
See Figure A.2 and Figure A.4 for the format of these reports. 
Figures A.3 and Figure A.S of the Appendix A give the expla-
nation of the fields contained in the reports. When an EMR 
or FMR is filled out, the failing assembly and the form are sent 
back to the factory. The failing assembly is analyzed to deter-
mine the cause of the failure. The information on the report 
is then entered into a data base. All of the computers using 
the utilization reporting system use the FMR or the EMRi however, 
all of the computers using the FMR or EMR do not use the equip-
ment utilization report. Part of this study required that the 
number of computers under investigation be known for each time 
interval. This is the reason that only the 169 computers that 
are in the field utilization program were used in the distribu-
tion analysis. 
An example of the raw failure data is given in Figure 6. This 
failure was isolated to a control memory printed circuit card 
in the field. The failure analysis laboratory determined that 
the failure was in the integrated circuit at location 16 on the 
card and that the failure mechanism within the chip was open metal 
electromigration (12C). The FMR and EMR both contain a block 
within field 36 to explain the observed failure characteristicsi 
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"INTERMITTENT" is one of the possible characteristics to check in 
this block. Unfortunately, reporting in this block has been erratic 
and this block was not entered into the data base. This is 
the reason the failure mechanism was used to define which 
failures have been intermittent prior to going hard. 
Once the EMR and FMR are completed, the data is entered into 
Sperry Univac's reporting and retrieval system. The computer 
file has, theoretically, a field for every block of data on the 
EMR or FMR. The failure data can be sorted and ranked by the 
fields in any order that the user wants. This allows for quick 
and easy access to the specific information that the user wants. 
An example of retrieval data is given in Figure 7. 
4.3 Components 
A brief description of the components that Sperry Univac uses 
is as follows: 
1) Integrated Circuits: The integrated circuits used are pur-
chased to Sperry Univac specifications which require process-
ing, inspection and both screening and sample testing in 
accordance with MIL-M-38510, and MIL-STD-883 for Class B 
devices. 
2) Semiconductor Devices: The semiconductor devices used are 
purchased to Sperry Univac specifications which require pro-
cessing, inspection and both screening and sample testing in 
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Figure 7 Retrieved Example of Failure Data 
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accordance with MIL-S-19500 and the applicable slash 
specs for JAN TX devices. 
3) Passive Devices: The majority of the passive devices used 
are MIL or ER equalifiers and are purchased to the appli-
cable military specifications. 
4.4 Data Base 
Sperry Univac had four programs in the above data reporting 
system which were applicable to this study. The application of 
these programs were two shipboard, one submarine and one avionics. 
For these programs approximately 21,000 field failures were on 
file from the past five years. However, not all the failures 
in this data base were reported with the time of failure (Elapse 
Time Meter). In addition, the reporting system is dynamic with 
computers of all age groups being included. It was decided to 
concentrate upon the one ship-board program that made up the 
majority of the failures and the population of computers in our 
data base. To address the problem of changes in the occurrence 
of failures over time, it was decided to "freeze" the data base 
into three time periods and to include a computer in the time 
period only if that computer ran throughout the entire time 
period. 
4.5 Computer Description 
The computer which yielded sufficient data for use in this study 
18 
is a highly reliable, ruggedized multiple-processor system 
designed by Sperry Univac for military applications. To meet 
stringent environmental and functional specifications, this 
computer was designed to meet MIL-E-16400 (ship and shore) envi-
ronmental requirements. Other specifications and standards used 
for design objectives are as follows: 
Radio Frequency Interference: MIL-I-16910 
Shock: MIL-S-901 Class I Medium Weight 
Vibration: MIL-STD-167 Type I 
Salt Spray: FED-STD-151 Method 811 
\ Environmental Characteristics: 
Temperature Range: 
_54o C to +650 C (Operating) 
_62oC to +7SoC (Storage) 
Relative Humidity to 95% 
This computer is comprised of one or more of each of the following 
modules: 
Central Processor 
Input/Output Controller 
Memory 
Input/Output Adapters 
Power Supplies 
with the exception of the power supply, each module has a wire-
wrapped back panel terminating in receptacles that mate with the 
male connectors on the printed circuit cards and memory modules. 
All heat dissipated by circuit elements is transferred to the top 
19 
of the card or memory assembly by thermal conduction to metallic 
"T" bars. The assembled module is closed by a heat-exchange 
cover which makes thermal contact with all "T" bars. Ambient 
air drawn through the heat exchanger by the cabinet cooling sys-
tem removes heat to the outside. 
Man/Machine interface for maintenance actions is accomplished 
via a maintenance unit panel which provides operation controls and 
indicators which present internal computer register values needed 
to isolate printed circuit card failures. 
This computer is presently in operation in both shipboard and 
shore based applications. Due to the reporting structure com-
prising the data base available to Sperry Univac, only the shore 
based computers are involved in this study. The environment of 
the study-related computers is that of normal commercial com-
puter center operations. This implies ambient air temperatures 
of 70 0 p to 800 p with no shock or vibration exposure. 
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5.0 Study at the Computer Level 
5.1 Histograms 
All discussion that is to follow refers to the one computer 
discussed in Sections 4.4 and 4.5. The failure data was put 
into histograms for the following running time periods: 
10,000 hours, 5,000 hours, and 2,000 hours. These histograms 
reflect the hard failures, intermittent failures, and potential 
intermittent failures for that period. The data for the three 
time periods is based on a fixed number of computers for each 
period. The following is that relationship. 
Time Period 
o - 2,000 hrs 
o - 5,000 hrs 
o - 10,000 hrs 
Number of Computers 
169 
116 
48 
These histograms are shown in Figures 8 through 16. The data 
has been screened to eliminate failures which may skew the data. 
In addition, the screening determined that if a computer had more 
than one failure, they occurred in different modules and at 
different times so that the failures can be assumed to be indepen-
dent. The data represented in these histograms represents the 
first look at the computers in the reporting system. They have one 
limitation in that the failures are grouped in 250-hour blocks 
of time and that it was not possible to obtain raw data for this 
portion of the study. An interesting observation is that no 
intermittent failures were observed after 8000 hours. Appendix 
B.2 has the breakdown by time periods. 
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5.2 Analysis 
The failure data presented in these histograms was analyzed 
with respect to time to failure. Figure 17 lists the distri-
butions functions for time to failure. In Appendix B.3, confi-
dence intervals for the mean time to failure for the exponential 
distributions are given. The special form of the distribution 
for potentially intermittent failures in 0-10,000 hours (see 
Figure 14) suggests considering the time intervals 0-5000, 5000-
8250, and 8250-10,000 separately when determining confidence 
intervals for the parameters; this is what was done in Appendix 
B.3. 
For the Weibull distribution, confidence intervals for the param-
eters require the data to appear in ungrouped form which was not 
available. However, since the rank distribution of failures fol-
lows a beta distribution, confidence intervals for the fraction 
of failures are possible for the Weibull cases. At each time 
listed, there is a 90% chance that the fraction of failures that 
have occurred will be between the two values given. For example: 
In the potentially intermittent failures 0-2000 hours, one would 
expect by the time of 1000 hours between 27 and 32% of the fail-
ures to have occurred with a confidence of 90%. 
5.3 Procedure 
The first attempt in all cases was to fit an exponential distri-
bution to the data. The estimate of the mean time to failure 
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was total test time/total number of failures. The Chisquare test 
for goodness of fit was then used. For those distributions 
where the fit was poor, a Weibull distribution fit was attempted. 
To fit the Weibull, the data was ranked. Because the data was 
grouped, it was assumed that the last failure in each time inter-
val occurred at the endpoint of the time interval. 
The estimates of the Weibull shape and scale parameters were 
taken from the best fitted line of In (Time to failure of 
cumulative ith failure) -vs-ln In ((l-(Cumulative ith failure-.3)/ 
(n+.4»-1). The criterion for testing the Weibull distribution 
fit was the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff statistic. 
For the 0-10,000 hour distributions the limitations of Chisquare 
goodness of fit test became apparent. The test is sensitive to 
the number of cells used, the expectation of each cell, the 
expectation varying from cell to cell, the sample size, and the 
testing of a continuous distribution. For the 0-10,000 hour 
intermittent, it was difficult to obtain a constant expectation 
from cell to cell or an expectation of at least 5 for the poten-
tially intermittent failures. An alternative that is recommended 
in the literature is the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test for goodness of 
fit. The theory has been developed, however, for ungrouped data 
and limited results are available in the literature for grouped 
data for 30 or less observations. There is a procedure to obtain 
a conservative upper bound on the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff statistic, 
Dn , when the data is already grouped. This procedure follows: 
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1\ 
Let F. refer to the observed cumulative distribution value of ~ 
the ith cell and F. the fitted cumulative distribution value ~ 
the right end point of the ith cell i = 1,2, ... n. Let 
"/\ 
F = F = o. Observe that for each cell and every x that is 0 0 
sampled from that cell: 
A "" A 1\ F (x) - F (x) :S F. 
- F. 1 if F (x) >- F (x) ~ ~-
" F (x) S A 1\ > (1) F (x) - F. - F. 1 if F (x) F (x) ~ ~-
Hence for the ith cell: 
at 
( 2) Max [max«F(x) - ~(x»),(~(X)-F(X»t.~ max«~. - F. l),(F. ~. 1) ~ ~ ~- ~- ~-
x E ith cell 
But this can be rewritten as: 
(3) Max IF(X)-~(x)1 ~ Max«F.-~. l)'(~·-F. 1» ~ ~- ~~-
x E ith 
cell 
So finally: 
I 1'\ I I A I 1\ 1\ (4) Dn = sup F(x)-F(x) = max (max F(x)-F(x) )~max(max(F i-Fi-Y, (Fi-Fi_Y) 
x all 
cells 
x E: ith cell all i 
If the right hand side of (4) is less than a tables value of the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnoff statistic, then clearly D is less by transi-n 
tivity and the distribution would be acceptable as a good fit. 
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Figure 17 lists the fitted density functions that best describe 
the failure phenomenon of the computer. In addition we listed the 
values of the chisquare statistic and the upper bound for the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnoff statistic. The one situation where the 
Weibull and exponential fit was poor was the potentially inter-
mittent 0-10,000 hour case. The data as seen in the histogram 
of Figure 14 suggests a multimodal distribution that repeats it-
self after 5000 and 8250 hours. A piecewise fitting by the 
potential distribution was attempted. The parameters were cal-
culated by the statistic mentioned above. The constants 
aI' a 2 , a 3 are factors used to normalize the area under the pdf 
curve to 1. They are found by evaluating xi/n ~ Ji ~~ f(t)dt where 
x. is the number of failures occurring in the time period 
1 
(tj,ti),f is the density function for that time period and n is 
the total number of failures. The fit over the full 10,000 hours 
is acceptable. 
5.4 Conclusion of Unit Study 
The computers in each time period were in a repair mode, that is 
when a computer failed it was repaired and allowed to continue 
to run. The data was screened to insure that there was independence 
between failures in the same computer. The drawback is that the 
data was only available in grouped form. Another limitation is 
that the window size of units in the 0-10,000 hour time period, 
48, was small and could lead to the pattern of failures that is 
seen in figures 14 and 15. This sample size magnitude for the 
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0-10,000 period makes the pdf's found for this period question-
able. However, this sample size and their failures represent 
all the good data that Sperry Univac had available for this 
time period at the time this study was made. 
The modeling of time to hard failures at the computer level was 
done when the data base was frozen and the failures of micro 
circuits was retrieved. The numbers of computers in each window 
are given in figure 18. The raw data of time to failure was 
available for this part of the study. The models of exponential 
or Weibull time to hard failure were rejected by the conventional 
tests of goodness of fit. Figure 17a summarizes the modeling 
that was done. It is seen that the MTBF is increasing as the 
age of the computer increases. 
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Jhe pdf of fitted distribution of time to failure. 
"The X"l..and 0 values should be compared ,-lith 
the tables of Chisquare and Kolmogorov-Smirnoff." 
OescriEtion 
Intermittent Failures 
1 
o - 2000 hr. 8243.9 
1 
0 
-
5000 hr. 11,600 
.9734 
a -10000 hr. .9734 (9409) 
Potentially Intermittent 
pdf 
exp (--t/8243.9) 
exp (-t/ll ,600) 
t-· 0265 exp-( t/9409 ) .9734 
Test for Accegtino 
~'I.( 6 ) 
= 3.45 
\ 
,t (10) = 4.18 
Ko1mogorov-Smirnoff 
031 ~ .0943 
!:9 f 
o - 2000 h .9305 
r·(4l29.08) .9"305 
t-· 0695 exp -( t./4129 • 08) .9305 
Kolmogorov - SmirnaEf 
066 ~ .0813 
o - 5000 hr. 
o -10000 hr. 
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Figure 17 
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Description " CDF MTBF 
Hard Failures F (+) 
0-2000 hr. 
-.0454 
t " .81 
.0523(100) 3663 
0-5000 hr. 
-.1403 + t ).62 
.1069(100 4e60 
.0940(1~0) .64 0-10,000 hr. -.1015 + 5655 
Figure 17a 
6.0 Microcircuit Failure Data 
6.1 General Information 
The data base was studied according to the three time periods-
0-2,000, 5,000 and 10,000 hours. Due to the dynamic nature of 
the data reporting system, the numbers of computers in each 
window changed slightly from when the study at the unit level 
was made. The data base is composed of 196 cpmputers that have 
run at least 2,000 hours. of these computers, 139 have run at 
least 5,000 hours and 67 of these 139 have run at least 10,000 
hours. The reference to failures in this paper refers to solid 
failures that have been categorized by Sperry Univac into inter-
mittent, potentially intermittent, and hard classes. For brevity 
in the tables, these are referred to as I, II, and III respectively 
There are 18 micro circuit types included in this study. These 
comprise all digital microcircuits of the computer of this study. 
The 18 types made up the population of 1,552,649 in the 0-2,000 
hour period, 1,131,981 in the 0-5,000 hour period, and 528,577 
in the 0-10,000 hour period. Of these 18 types, 8 types ·had no 
failures of any kind and were a total of 20,622 or 1.3% of the 
1,552,649. For all failures, it was determined from the data base 
that no two microcircuits failed on the same card so that there 
is independence in the failures observed. The data base was also 
screened for failures that skewed the data, e.g. non-relevant 
overstress failures. Figure 18 summarizes the important information. 
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Time # Of # Of #; Of M:)st Failing .# Of # Of # Of 
Period Computers IC Digital J:evice Intermittents Pot. Int. Hard 
0-2000 196 1552649 58043 11 7 26 
0-5000 134:J 1131981 42249 27 10 44 
0-10000 67 528577 19637 8 8 35 
Total of 103 failures 
Part hours: 3.1053 X10 9 for 0-2000 hours 
5.6599 X10~ for 0-5000 hours 
5.2858 Xl0 9 for 0-10000 hours 
Computers in the 0-2000 group with no IC Failure 629,370 IC's 
Computers in the 0-5000 group with no IC Failure 277,814 IC's 
Computers in the 0-10000 group with no IC Failure 91,764 IC's 
Figure 18. Summary of Information 
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6.2 Analysis 
The probability distribution functions for time to failure are 
in Figure 19. A comparison of the reliability functions accord-
ing to the empirical, Weibull, and exponential distributions for 
each time period and failure type are in Appendix C. The 
criteria for determining, from the results in Appendix C.l, 
which of the two distributions, Weibull or exponential, appears 
in Figure 18 are the precision and maximum error from the 
empirical data these two distributions have. For example, the Weibull 
distribution for the 0-5,000 II group has:a maximum error of 1.2 
failures while the exponential has a maximum error of four fail-
ures. For the 0-2,000 I, 0-5,000 III and 0-10,000 III, the 
Weibull distribution has a greater maximum error than the exponen-
tial.' However, this error occurs towards the end of the time 
periods and the Weibull gives a consistently better fit than the 
exponential. Therefore, the Weibull distribution was used in 
Table C. 
The Appendix C.l suggests that the rate of change of intermittent 
failure rates is increasing while the rate of change of the hard 
failure rate is decreasing. One reason that the failure rate for 
0-10,000 I is increasing is because the first failure occurs 
after 1,000 hours and all occur within the next 3,600 hours. 
This contrasts with the earlier time periods that had failures 
observed as early as 100 hours. Additional data would be neces-
sary for the 0-10,000 time period to determine if the failure 
rate of solid intermittents is increasing. Appendix C.2 gives 
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~ 
0 FAILURE 'IYPE TIME PEPlCO DIS'lRIBl1l'ION FUNC'l'ION F (t) DIsmIBlJI'IOO HAZARD FUNCl'IOO MI'TF (1m) 
FUNcrION 'IYPE 
I 0-2,000 l-CXP-~ t 1
603 
Wciwll 
.603 t -.397 
1.3B4 Xlo12 
9.254 XIOll (9'''254 XIOll) .603 
I 0-5,000 1~XP-(209, i26,lll) Exponential 4.B XlO-9 2.096 X10B 
I 0-10,000 ~t6017 l~xp- 455 5450 ~iwll 1.6017 t .6017 (455 5450) 1.6011 4.0B X106 
.1 7 -.3 1~XP-~6.4~28 XI01O) . t . 8.13 X1010 II 0-2,000 ~ibull (6.4228 XIO)·7 
II 0-5,000 1 ~ t }6179 Weibull .6179 t-· 3821 7.3325 XI011 ~xP .8728 X1011 (4.8728 XI011).6179 
II 0-10,000 ~ t )"8111 Weiwll .8111 t -.1889 5.98 X109 l~xp- (5.332 XI09).8111 
.332 X109 
0-2,000 t t ~ Exponential 8.4 XlO-9 1.1943 Xl08 III l~xp- 1.1943 x 108 
III 0-5,000 l~XP-~ t 1964 We ibul 1 .964 t -.036 1.56 XI08 (153 398 200)·964 153 398 200 
III 0-10,000 1~XP-' t . ) .8451 .8451 t-·
1549 
6.76 Xl08 Weiwll (619 08B 092)·8451 619 080 092 
Figure 19. Summary of Predicted Distribution 
i; 
. I 
'to ,. 
the breakdown for the data in C.l by vendor and C.3 has the 
breakdown by module function of quantities of micro circuits 
and failures. The vendor-failure relationship is not very 
strong. However, the function of input/output control has the 
most failures for all three failure categories. There is also 
a positive correlation of quantities of integrated circuits 
with quantities of failures. 
Figure 20 has the calculations for the confidence intervals for 
the parameter of the exponential pdf. To determine confidence 
intervals for the parameters of the Weibull pdf is exceedingly 
more difficult. The procedure to follow could be that described 
by J. F. Lawless in the November 1978 issue of Technometrics. 
6.3 Discussion of Significance 
The procedure followed is typical of most studies of this nature. 
Screening was performed to get good independent data. With a 
type one error of .05, i.e., a significance level of .95, all 
time periods with the exclusion of 0-10,000 hr III (hard failures) 
would have the hypothesis of exponential pdf's accepted. The 
goodness of fit test that was used is that of Gnendenko which is 
the most powerful test for exponentiality for censored samples. 
A goodness of fit in censored samples for the Weibull pdf using 
the suggestions of Michael and Schucany of November 1979, 
Technometrics was done. For all cases, except 0-2,000 III and 
0-10,000 III, the type one error is greater than .2 for reject-
ing the Weibull hypothesis. For 0-5,000 III the error would be 
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Lower Limit MTTF UQQer Limit 
0-2000 I 2.75 X lOS 2.S23 X lOS 1. 74 X 10 9 
0-5000 I 1. 49 X lOS 2.096 X lOS 3.20 X lOS 
0-10,000 I 3.06 X lOS 6.6 X lOS 1.53 X 10 9 
0-2000 II 2.66 X lOS 5.17 X lOS 1. 41 X 10 9 
0-5000 II 3.59 X lOS 6.29 X lOS 1. 37 X 10 9 
0-10,00011 3.66 X lOS 6.6 X lOS 1. 53 X 109 
0-2000 III S.5 X 107 1.19 X lOS 1.S2 X lOS 
0-5000 III 9.73 X 107 1. 2S X lOS 1. 7S X lOS 
Figure 20. 95% Confidence Intervals for Exponential pdf of Study 
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.05 and for 10,000 III it would be .01. Thus, there is good 
reason for accepting the Weibull pdf's. 
The literature does not consider the problem of confidence when 
the magnitude of the population and failures observed are the 
size of our study. One could put little faith in the study if 
one considered the quantity failed--population size ratio of 
-5 
out study, 6.6 x 10 ,as unrepresentative of a mortality study. 
On the other hand, the most pessimistic MTTF determined in the 
study suggests we should have to wait 328 years to have 38% of 
the devices fail. Another factor that mades the conclusions of 
this study doubtful is the evolving state of the art. The micro-
circuits are constantly improving in reliability. The computer 
we ship today has a MTBF that is greatly improved over the "same" 
computer that was used in this study. Taking all of these 
factors into account, this study reflects the current state of the 
art of SSI digital devices operating in the field. 
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7.0 Conclusions 
An intermittent failure is a detected malfunction of a logic net 
which resumes normal operation prior to the time needed to isolate 
the malfunctioning device. Due to the impracticability of having 
Sperry Univac's customers record the manifestation of intermit-
tent failures, the phenomenon is not currently in Sperry Univac's 
reporting system. However, Sperry Univac engineers have deter-
mined which failure mechanism could be intermittent before they 
go hard and are reported. 
To study the failure phenomenon three time periods - 0-2000, 
0-5,000, and 0-10,000 hour, were established, and three non-
'exclusive groups of computers were determined. These 
computers were in a repair environment. Failures in the study 
at the computer level included non-microcircuit devices. 
The best fitting distributions of time between intermittent 
failures are exponential for the 2000 and 5000 hour time periods. 
The distribution is Weibull for the 10,000 hour time period. 
The confidence intervals for MTBF indicate that the MTBF increases 
as the time period increases. This suggests that the occurence of 
intermittent failures is more frequent in the early life of the 
computer. The potential intermittent failure class shows a 
Weibull distribution of time between failure in the 2000 and 
5000 hour time period. The failure rate for potential intermittents 
is increasing as the life of the computer increases. The 
10,000 hour time period appears to have a trimodal distribution 
for potentially intermittent failures. This may be due to 
the small number of computers in this time period. 
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For the same three time periods, a study of the digital micro 
circuits of the selected computer was made. The best fitting dis-
tributions for time to intermittent failure indicates that the rate 
of change of the intermittent failures rate is increasing. This 
means that a digital microcircuit is more likely to experience 
intermittent failure as the circuit gets older. The potential 
intermittent failure class shows a Weibull distribution of time 
to failure with a decreasing failure rate in all three time periods. 
The hard failure class shows the opposite phenomenon of the inter-
mittent failure class. The rate of change of the hard failure rate 
is decreasing, which means the microcircuits are less likely to 
experience hard failures as they get older. These results apply 
up to an age of 10,000 hours for the selected computer and the 
microcircuits. 
The data for the digital microcircuits occur in Type I censored 
form. Methods that are discussed in the literature regarding 
goodness of fit for censored samples were used. For all failure 
classes and time periods, with the exception of the 0-10,000 hour 
hard failure case, either the exponential or the Weibull distribution 
could be used as models. The final list of pdf's in Figure 18 is 
based upon an examination of Appendix C for the precision and 
accuracy of the goodness of fit. There is a positive correlation 
(.84)" between the number of microcircuits in a module and the 
number of intermittent failures that module type has. The distri-
bution of microcircuit intermittent and potentially intermittent 
failure, according to vendor- is not uniform. One vendor who supplied 
1.6 percent of the microcircuit population had 66.7 percent of the 
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intermittent failures. 
It is questionable whether the available data regarding the 
number of failures, the time periods, and the populations of 
microcircuits are adequate to establish accurate predictability. 
After 10,000 hours, only .0096 percent of the population to 
this time period have experienced a failure. It would 
require, based upon the highest failure rate found, 29.9 
years to have one percent of this population fail. 
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APPENDIX A.I 
UNIVAC EQUIPMENT UTILIZATION REPORT 
EQUIPMENT PROJECT UNIVAC SERIAL NUMBER CUSTOMER SERIAL NUMBER 
REPORT PERIOD 
DATE SUBMITTED DATE STARTED DATE ENDED RUNNING TIME METER 
USE RTM ON POWER SUPPLY 
RTM END 
LOCATION SUBMITTED BY RTM START 
RTM TOTAL 
TAPE TRANSPORT RUNNING TIME METER READINGS (IF APPLICABLE) 
TT NO. SIN RTM TT NO. SIN RTM TT NO. SIN RTM TT NO. SIN RTN 
EQUIPMENT FAILURES 
MODULE SIN RTM PART NUMBER DATE OF FAILURE DOWNTIME FMR NUMBER NOTE 
-- -SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND "":;. )MPLISHMENTS DURING REPORT PERIOD: 
UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS: 
NOTES: 
OI?ERATIONAL STATUS: 
o OPERATIONAL o LIMITED o INACTIVE o TRANSFERRED o STORAGE o DOWN 
UD1-3713 
DISTRIBUTION: 1. white - FIELD ENG. TECH. SUPPORT GROUP 
3. pink - FIELD ENG. MTC. SUPPORT GROUP 
2. yellow - QUALITY PROGRAM GROUP 
4. g'rod - ORIGINA TOR 
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sr=e~V4~UNIVAC 
5 SITE 8 CAB INET TYPE 
APPENDIX A.2 
1 FMR NO. 
FAILURE/MALFUNCTION REPORT D 53689 
9 CA.S SINO. 10 eTM HOURS 12 TYPE AEP'T 
2 
CI 
o 
3 4 
PR CL 
I I 
6 PAOJ 7 FAIL. DATE 
V Y M M 
I I I I I 
o 0 
I I I I I I I I I 
11 REPAIR 
MIN 
I I 
GI FAN OUT e RETROFIT ~ DEBUG ~ SCREEN ITl PRE FAT ~ ALL EQUIP 21 BURN IN § SPARES ~ CHECKOUT 
@] FAT IDl TEMP 2 OUAL [J COM' 0 
13 TYPE 
o 0 PRI M MAINT ~ WEAR 
14 CHAS TYPE 15 CHAS SINO 16 
SUBA 
TYPE 
17 SUSA SINO. 18 SUBA REF 19 SUB ASSEMBL.V PART NUMBER 20 CASH 21 AEPL SINO. 
FAILURE ~ AOJUST[D INTERMIT 
W ~~B~SPO I I I I I I I ILl I I I I I I I I I I I I I ~~2~2~R~E~F~0~O~C~N~O~.~----r.2~3~24~~~2'~C~O~M~P~~26~CO~M~P~O~N~E~NT~PA~R~T~N~U~M~B~E~R--L-~27~0~A~S~H~2~8~V~E~N~~~OA~T~E~C~O~0~Er.~~F~A~ILL-+'3~I~J~;32'*AE"P~O~R~T~EO~BY~,-r~~~~~~~~~ 
..... CI COMP REF Y Y W W CODE RES1E IMPLIOYIEE NO. II. TYPE 
~ I I I I I I 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
:z::: ~ AOOITIONAL DATA 
== 
w 
... 
al 
:I 
o 
a: 
... 
w 
:z::: 
... 
~ 
~ 
:z::: 
~ 
I I I I I I I II I I I I I I I I LI I I I 111Jlli I I I II I I I 
33 LOCATION OR SITE 38 CONTRACT NUMBER EMPLOYEE NAME 
I I l I I I I I I I J 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
38 A. FAILURE DESCRIPTION B. ACTION TAKEN C. EFFECT OF ACTION O. MAINT. PROBLEMS 
37 ANALYST NAME ANOIOR 
EMPLOYEE NUMBER 
"!' Y M MOD 
CORIGINATOR - DO NOT WRITE BELOW THIS LINE) 
I I I I I I I 
~ I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
~ 
~ 
<t 
a: 
~ 
w 
e 
w 
a: 
:I 
... 
=i 
II. 
!:i 
:I 
<t 
II. 
I I I I I I I I 
CHECK (V) IF YES 
o OIAG DETECT 
o DIAG ISOLATE 
o LOAD FAILURE 
o HEAT SENSITIVE 
o SHOCK SENSITIVE 
o INTERMITTENT 
o FAILURE VERIFIED 
o SPARE AVAILABLE 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
UOI·3180 (REV. 8176) WHITE - Quality/Reliability Programl CANARY - CUltomar Rep. or - to Quality Support for Return to Originator 11 __ ..... _ .. "' ____ ... 1 __ _ 
~"". f"'\1:!".O"'"" "'_1_1_ ... __ 
APPENDIX A.3 
FAILURE/MALFUNCTION REPORT 
UDI·3180 (Rev. 81761 
Originate the F:Jilure/Malfunction Report (FMR) for each repair action, failure. or ~alfunctlon that Involves a part. sub·assembly, chassis or 
unit of Univac aQlJI·pment. It is the r'!s?onsibility of the person who makes the repair, replacement or discovers a malfunction to origir,ate the 
--....... .• _____ f.~R. The form i~ .jivided Into thre~ sections: (1) WHAT FAILED - descrlb~s ..,.,hat failed, where. when and who originated the form; (2) 
--nHAT WAS THE TROUBLE - details what hap;lered and what was done to cc:-rect the problem; and (3) FAULT·FAILURE/REPAIR 
ANAL YSIS - describes the mode and cause of the failure. 
The originator fills In the first two sections. Print th .. data using ball point pen to make the data clear on all carbon caples. Retain the golden· 
rod copy of the form and forward the FMR (3 caples or 2 if Customer Rep. copy Is pulled on site) as listed: 
NO PART INVOLVED 
MAILING ADDRESS 
SPERRY UNIVAC DSD, FIELD ENGR .. MS M2A01 
P.O. BOX 3525 
ST. PAUL, MINN. 55165 
FMR WITH PART 
SHIPPING ADDRESS 
SPERRY UNIVAC DSD, RETURNED GOODS CRIB 
2750 WEST 7TH BLVD. 
ST. PAUL, MINN. 55116 
DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS FOR ORIGINATING THE FMR FORM 
(1) ,WHAT FAILED SECTION 
Place the hardoaper flap below the FMR set being filled cut to prevent spoiling the sets below. Enter each digit clearly In the alloned 
space, as this data goes directly to Comp\J~er Data Sank via Scooe Input. Identify the letter I as '1"; numberlc 1 as "I"; the leaer 0 as 
"""; numberic zero as "0"; the letter S as "S"; the lener U as "U."; the letter Z as "~"; the letter J as "J"; and capitalize all other letters. 
Do nor enter any more letters or digits than a block allows or use any codes not authorized by this procedure. Enter only the aata in each 
. blOCK for which Information Is available using the codes contained In the code tables. If a code is not available, enter the Information in 
Bloclt. 36. Enter In these blocks: 
Block No. Block Title 
6. FROJ. 
7 rAIL DATE 
8 CABINET TYPE 
9 CAB SIN 
10 E.T.M. (HOURS) 
11 REPAIR MIN 
12 T"YPE REPORT 
13 TYPE OF FAILURE 
14 CHASSIS TYPE 
15 CHASSIS SIN 
16 SUBA TYPE 
17 SUBA SIN 
18 SUBA REF. 
19 SU:BASSEMBL Y 
PART NUMBER 
20 DASH 
Explanation 
Project code (See codes - Block 
61. 
Date failure was detectC1d. 
Sperry Univac cabinet type 
number. 
Sperry Univac Manufacturing ser· 
lal numb .. r. 
Elapsed Time M~ter reading to 
nearest hour. 
Time to repair In minutes _. Iso· 
late, repair and verify - no 
logistics 
Type of report code (See codes If 
not preprinted'} 
Check applicable block. 
Chassis type designation or code 
(See codes - Block 141. 
Sperry Univac Manufacturing ser· 
lal number. 
Subassembly type code (See 
codes - Block 16). 
Sperry Univac Manufacturing ser· 
lal number. 
Reference designation (position) 
from which failed subassembly 
was removed. 
Sperry Univac part number of 
failed subassembly. 
Sperry Univac dash number of 
failed subassembly. 
Block No-. Block Title 
21 REPL SIN 
22 REF DOC N:J. 
24 COMPo TYPE 
25 COMPo REF. 
26 COMPONENT 
27 DASH 
28 VEND. CODE 
29 DATE CODE 
32 REPORTED BY 
33 LOCATION OR 
SITE 
38 CONTRACT 
NUMBER 
EMPLOYEE 
NAME 
Explanation 
Serial Number of the replacement 
item. 
Associated FMR/FR/FCO/EIR, 
Etc. 
Component or part type code 
when component or part Is 
removed (See codes - Block 24). 
Component or part references 
designation (position) of failed 
component or part. 
Sperry Univac part number of 
failed component or part when 
component or part Is removed. 
Sperry Univac dash number of 
failed component or part. 
Fill In vendor name In Block 36 
If applicable. 
Vendor date code as applicable 
when components or parts are 
removed. 
Employee number of person 
originating FMR. 
Name of location or site where 
failure occurred. 
Contract number covering unit on 
which maintenance or testing is 
performed. 
I nitials and last name of person 
originating FMR. 
NOTES: 1. When Manufacturing serial or type numbers are not available, enter customer nomenclature and serial number in Block 36. 
2. Originator does not make entries in Blocks 3,4,5,28,30,31, and 35. Make entries in Blocks 24 through 29 only when repairs 
occur at the component/part level. 
(2) WHAT WASTHE TROUBLE SECTION 
A. Failum hcription - Fill in a brief description of the symptoms of failure. operation routine, test and debugging procedure, errors 
noted, 'Dt" ·'lther failure conditions Observed. Give sufficient facts about the failure to adequately reconstruct the failure conclitions 
_. for eac!'ll8\el of assembly. 
B. Action ·laklllft. - Fill in what was done to isolate this failure/malfunction and to rapace or adjust the equipment to remove the prob· 
lem. Trouble \hooting notes such as switching of subassemblies, running diagnostic routines, testing for open or shorted pins, etc., 
are extremely r,e'.pful . 
. C. Effect of Action - Fill in what tests were run following the replacement of a failed part indicating the equipment is again opera· 
tional. Also note ~'lIrt or assembly disposition, e.g., scrap, returned for analysis and/or repair with FMR. 
D. Maintenance Probillms - Enter problems which were encountered during this maintenance action. Notes as to availability of spares, 
replacements, damage, inadequate tools, and troubles in disassembling are helpful for future design considerations. 
51 
Appendix A.4. Field Failure Report Forms 
----•• 'I. UNIV.AC 
.:, ~ ::~-:. ~,.. -;~ 
,/ . EQUIPMENT MALFUN9TION REPORT 
. 
I 
I 
I' 
i 
" 
I 
J ! ' 
J I , .
... 
~o~~~,:~~~~~.-----r~~~~~~~~QCA~~r.~,c~,~----------------------~ 
.' 
. ;, :> 
:: 
!-. 
<:<. \ .. :i 
,,). ,-
,',.' 
...... 
". ~. 
. '.,::.' 
:l~;{I'. 
? ::; , .t·~·· ~'. 
-;.;: 
, I"~ 
\", 
',," .. 
. .. ~', 
FAILURE.ANALYSIS DATA 
'<, 
.... -... _. 
" 
',", 
",". 
.' 
'j 
CHECK hi I I~ YES 
COlAO OETECT 
COlAO ISOLATE 
C LOAO FAILURE 
C HEAT SENSITIVE 
C SHOCK SENSITIVE 
C INTERMITTENT 
C 
C 
h'~ _________________ ~ __________ ---t 
'\1 ...:,..: '. '  :-' ~ : 
" .~.~. ------------~--------------------------------------------~-----~Lt -.--... --.... ' ...... , ... ~-.~~." ::,----~,....:-.;.--------.-- .. 
~.~:;,.... _ •.••. ..", . ~ .J. .. -te.o.... .. . 
. ~ .?- - ':'.~ 
'., 
:~~ ~' .. ;-':"':-- ..... \ .... ~. 
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DETAILED Ir:~TRUCTlor.;S 
APPENDIX A.5 
EMR INSTRUCTIONS 
COMPLETE ALL OPEN BLOCKS AS FOLLOWS (FRONT SIDE ONLY) 
BlK. NO. BlK TYPE 
0 EQUIP NAME 
1 . EMR NO. 
3 PR 
5 SITE CODE 
7 FAIL DATE 
9 EQUIPr-,1ENT SIN 
10 ETM HRS 
11 REPAIR TIME 
12 - REPAIR TYPE 
13 . TYPE OF FAilURe: 
14 MOD/CHASSIS TYPE 
15 MOD/CHASSIS SIN 
10 SUBA TYPE 
17 SUBASSY SIN 
18 SU!3ASSY REF 
19 SUBASSY PART NO. 
20 DASH 
'1 REPLACEMENT SIN 
22 RELATED EMR NO. 
32 NAME' 
33 SITE/lOCATION 
36 . PROBLEi·.1 
COMMENTS 
, . 
.. 
38 PART TYPE 
39 PART NO. 
40 DASH NO. 
, ~ . 
.. , ...... 
.' 
",-
. ::", 
. :. : .. ' 
.. :. ~""." 
.. ~ "'.~ :, 
. . ~.; .. "" 
EXPLANATION 
Enter the er.;utpm~nt namp., e.g .• UYK·20, UYK·7, CP901. etc. 
Equipm~nt M;;lfu'lction n,~po.t Numb:!r .. 
Part neturned Y for YES. r. for NO. 
Site Cod~- Entp.r the unique numb~r for !l:l::h site whidl can be obtained from 
Sparry Univac. STP 
Enter the d;!te of the failure. 
Equipmt:nt Serial Number - Enter the com=,iete customer serial number from the eQuipm~nt 
nameplat~. 
Modure Elap.e Time Met!!r - Enter the ETr,1 reiidings of the module in which the failure 
occurred. If there is only one ET~.1, entnr that r~(lcling. e.g., UYK·20. 
Enter the actual time to efft!ct the repair, in minutf!s, NOT inc1di'lU p:;rts acql'isition. 
Check on~ of the blocks. E!Vl - Emer,,,~lic'l M~:n:., f'~.1 - Plc',entive Maint., FC - Field 
Change Order, IC - InSI.c!liat!on end ChZCKout . 
Check one for the typ~ of failure. PRI - Prim<!ry Failure, SEC - Scccnt!::ry Failure. 
Chassis Typ~. C?U - Central Processor Unit. iOC - InputiOut;Jllt Ccntrc!!~r. lOA - Input/ 
OUtput Adapter. ~.~E~.l - ;-":cmory, DD:.1 - Double Dellsi,V ~,:efTlory, C .. '.B - C2bin<:t, 1S-
Test Set, PS- Power SUpj)iV, ~ .. i? -Mil!nten;:n~e Panel, ROCU - R;.!rr.ote Op;rator Console Unit. 
Chassis S·~riel Number - Enter the seriul numb~r of the modulu ttle failure occurred in. 
Enter sub.:w?mbly t';r~, i.e .. PC. 
Enter Serial Numbu of the f:Jiied SUBASSY. 
Enter the location of the faired SU3ASSY, e.g., J32C. 
Enter the Univac pait nlJl-:1b.:r for the failcd major assembly not including d .. sh numl!e~. 
Entar the dash number of the failed item in Block 19. 
Enter the replacement Part/A~sy Serial tJo. 
Use only if secondJry failure. 
Name of the indilo'ic!ual m;.king this report. If feedback is desired incll!do m"iling c:ddress on 
the reverse sid!! of the first copy. 
Enter the n.:mp. of the sit~ and ~eoaraohic location. 
Use this sp·Jce for a narrative de~cription or the f"iluri! to inci:!rle problem dE;criptior., how 
the .problem was isolated (diagnostics, etc.I, corrective ac:ion, and any difficultie~ in isolating 
the malfunction. If FCO Oi ECP installation, include the change tYpe and numb~r or any 
other unusual circumst;;nc!!s. 
Enter part typP., e.g., RES for Resistor, IC for rn~egrated Circuit. 
Enter the part number of the failed pdrt (comlJonent) ent!!red in Block 38. 
Enter a 3-digit dash numb!!r. 
( 
--.- -- .:..~: 53 
54 
250 
500 
750 
1000 
1250 
1500 
1750 
2000 
2250 
2500 
2750 
3000 
3250 
3500 
3750 
4000 
4250 
4500 
4750 
5000 
-' 
APPENDIX B.l 
FAILURE DATA ACCORDING TO UNITS 
Intermittent : Potentially Intermittent 
Q-~Qgo 0-5000 0-10000 1 ~~O()O Q-5QQO Q=.l..OQOJ1 0-2000 
Total 
9-5000 0-1002-q 
5 
4 
4 
6 
4 
6 
7 0 
_LI 
I 
! 
i 
2 2 12 5 1 30 15 9 
2 2 11 9 4 44 36 15 
3 0 6 4 2 20 16 5 
3 0 16 14 4 39 29 6 
1 1 6 5 0 38 25 10 
5 1 3 3 3 21 18 7 
2 I 0 i 5 4 3 36 21 15 
2 ~ 3; 7 .. _j ______ . 6. _______ 5___P 18 15 
.. -2---·, ------·-0----; -- - 8 4 26 9 
2 I 1 I 3 0 17 2 
4 i 2 I 9 4 19 8 
3 I 2 2 0 13 6 
2 i 0 6 3 25 13 
2 1 4 1 26 11 
2 0 3 1 38 1 
2 2 4.i 0 11 5 
1 4 0 3 0 16 3 
-S"25U-·----- . ~ __ 1 1- ~~-------J---~---l---uL -i! 
I ! 2 5 17 5500 
5750 
6000 
6250 
6500 
6750 
7000 
7250 
7500 
7750 
8000 
8250 
8500 
8750 
9000 
9250 
9500 
9750 
10000 
I b 3 5 
. 0 3 5 
.1 
35
16 
1 8
20  
2 2 11 
1 2 10 
024
1 '.0 2 
15
g 1: ii 
g I ~ : 
g 1__ _______ ~_ __!._ ____ L_. ______ L 
i 
I 
i 
I 
. , , 
, ( 
- ! 
I 
I 
I 
~ ! 
I 
t 
o 
Ul 
Ul 
Intermittent 
Pot8ntially 
Intermittent 
Hard 
Totals 
&. 
APPENDIX B.2 
FAILURE TOTALS BY CATEGORY 
o - 2000 2000 - 5000 5000 - 10000 Total 
41 30 11 82 
66 51 43 160 
148 142 89 379 
255 223 143 621 
APPENDIX B~3 
Confidcnc~ ~ntervals of Parameters of Table 16 
Description 90~ C. r. 95% C.I. 
~rmitte~t Failures (6267 , 11193) (6014 , 11829) 
0-2000 hour 
Intermittent Failuces (9184, 14885) (8767, 15630) 
0-5000 hour 
PotentiallY Intermittent (4873, 6830) (4778, 7070) 
(0-5000 hr) 
Potential Iv Intermittent 
0-10,000 hours 
0- 5,000 hours (5302, 9277) (5051, 9846) 
5000 8250 (4478, 8562) (4227 I 9186) 
8250 - 10000 (3373, 7479) (3157, 8172) 
Potentially Intermittent n = 169 
o - 2000 hr. 
~ ~ank 95~ Rank 
250 .0408 .119 
500 .0947 .1807 
750 .1234 .2208 
1000 .2105 .3229 
1250 .2245 .3622 
1500 .2578 .3815 
1750 .288 .413 
2000 .3263 .4567 
", 
. -.-.... __ .... - -... 
.."-- -. - -. _ .......... _ .. _--.- - .... _._ .... _ ...... _- --.. _ ..--_._.- .. _.---- '. __ . --- ._- .. - .. __ . 
... ....-~. ----
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Intermittent Failures n = 48 
o - 10,000 
~ 
250 
500 
750 
1000 
125'0 
1500 
1750 
2000 
2250 
2500 
2750 
3000 
3250 
3750 
4000 
4250 . 
4500 
4750 
5000 
5250 
5500 
5'750 
6000 
6250 
6500 
6750 
7000 
7250 
7500 
8000 
8250 
9500 
8750 
9000 
9250 
9500 
9750 
10,000 
5~ Rank 
.01 
.03 
.03 
.03 
.04 
.06 
.06 
• 1 
• 1 
.12 
.15 
.19 
.19 
.20 
.24 
.24 
."26 
.27 
.29 
.33 
.37 
.37 
.37 
.37 
.37 
.39 
.43 
.47 
.49 
.51 
.51 
.51 
.51 
.51 
.51 
.51 
.51 
.51 
~5% Rank 
.09 
.15 
.15 
.15 
.18 
.21 
.21 
.28 
.28 
• 3 
.35 
.39 
.39 
.42 
.46 
.46 
.48 
• 5 
.52 
.56 
.61 
.61 
.61 
.61 
.61 
.62 
.66 
• 7 
.72 
.74 
.74 
.74 
.74 
.74 
.74 
.74 
.74 
.74 
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i 
~ 
I 
i 
t 
! 
r, ~ 
• APPENDIX C.l i 
CONPARISON OF DISTRIBUTONS I 0-2000 I i OESV. WEI BULL CBSV. WEIBULL EXPC~E:·;TI.~.: .; TIME EXPO~E~;TI.!.!.. .. ! 
Lllk.. RELIABILITY RELIABILITY RELI.3..9 IT TTY St:~VTVORS StTRVIVCRS Sr,.-R',,·!'flC:::S .: 
• 
100 .99999871 .99999901 .99999964 1552647 1552647.4 1552648.4 ~ ! 289 806 814 897 46 46.1 47.4 \ 497 742 742 823 45 44.9 46.3 ! 
· 616 678 706 781 44 44.4 45.6 ~ i 1017 613 603 639 43 42.8 43.4 , 1375 549 524 . 512 42 41.6 41.4 > j 1450 484 508 486 41 41. 3 41 t t 1843 420 432 347 40 40.1 38.8 , 1938 355 414 313 39 39.9 38.3 ! 1 1983 291 406 297 38 39.7 38 I 0-5000 I 100 .99999823 .99999881 .99999952 1131979 1131979.6 1131980.4 i 289 734 744 862 78 78.1 79.4 ! 455 646 644 782 77 76.9 78.5 f 
.497 558 620 762 76 76.7 78.3 J 616 469 556 706 75 '75.9 77 .6 1 1017 381 361 514 74 73.7 75.5 I 1375 293 204 344 73 72 73.5 1843 204 016 120 72 69.8 71.0 1938 116 .99998979 075 71 69.4 70.5 j I 1983 028 962 054 70 69.2 70.2 I 2268 .99998939 855 .99998918 69 68 68.7 2520 851 764 797 68 67 67.3 - ' I 2622 763 728 749 67 66.6 66.8 - I 2799 674 666 664 66 65.9 65.8 2802 586 665 663 65 65.8 65.8 · i 3165 498 542 490 64 64.5 63.9 ! 3428 409 455 364 63 63.5 62.4 i 3911 321 299 134 62 61.7 59.8 I ! 3949 233 287 116 61 61.6 59.6 I 4037 144 260 074 60 61.3 59.2 I 4142 056 227 024 59 60.9 58.6 4561 .99997968 098 .99997824 58 59.4 56.3 I 4603 879 086 804 57 59.3 56.1 4835 791 016 693 56 58.5 54.8 I 4840 703 015 691 55 58.5 54.8 4992 761 .99997969 618 54 58 S4 
0-10000 I 1017 .99999810 .99999858 .99999846 528576 528576.2 76.1 1938 621 601 706 75 74.9 75.4 1983 432 586 699 74 74.8 75.4 2622 243 353 603 73 73.5 74.9 
-I 2799 OS4 282 576 72 73.2 74.7 3911 .99998864 .99998773 408 71 70.5 73.8 3949 675 753 402 70 70.4 73.8 4603 486 407 303 69 68.5 73.3 
58 
0-2000 II 
TIME OBSV. HEIBULL EXPONE!-iTIAL 03SV. HEIBULL EXPO~E:\7r .~.: !2ll R=:LIJ..3IL!'r'Y RELI~.~ILITY RELI~.3ILITY StJ~V!VCRS StiR.VIVC?S St.~~~l!\·C:\S 
186 .99999935 .99999894 .99999964 1552648 1552647.3 1552648.4 195 806 890 962 46 47.3 48.4 291 742 B55 943 45 46.7 48.1 919 677 677 822 44 43.9 46.2 952 613 669 816 43 43.8 46.1 1698 549 503 671 42 41.2 43.9 
0-5000 II 186 .99999911 .99999848 .99999967 1131980 1131979.2 1131980.6 l 195 734 844 965 78 79.2 80.6 291 646 800 485 77 7B.7 80.4 I 919 558 593 837 76 76.3 79.1 I 952 469 584 831 75 76.2 79 I 1698 381 405 700 74 74.2 77 .6 2729 293 20"3 517 73 71.9 75.5 
1 
2730 204 203 517 72 71.9 75.5 3149 116 129 443 71 71.1 74.4 I 0-10000 II 291 .99999810 .99999871 .99999955 528576 52B576.3 528576.7 952 621 663 855 75 75.2 76.2 I 1698 432 461 743 74 74.1 75.6 
. ·1 2729 243 209 586 73 72.8 74.8 2730 054 208 586 72 72.8 74.8 
- I 3149 .99998864 111 523 71 72.3 74.4 { I 5320 675 .99998641 194 70 69.8 72.7 
'1 5960 486 509 097 69 69.1 72.2 
59 
0-2000 III 
TIME OBSV. \-lEIBULL EXPONENTIAL 
~ RELI ;'.3 :::LI":Y :<.ELr;'.BILITY RELIABILITY 
287 .99999935 .99999770 .99999;59 
295 871 762 753 
.299 806 758 749 
306 742 749 743 
333 677 725 721 
341 613 717 714 
352 549 706 705 
412 484 644 655 
423 -420 632 645 
437 355 617 634. 
465 291 587 610 
531 227 515 555 
573 162 468 520 
646 098 385 459 
926 033 048 224 
1000 • 99998959 .99993955 . 162 
1014 905 937 151 
1020 840 929 145 
1117 776 804 064 
1162 711 746 027 
1245 647 636 .99998957 
1277 583 593 930 
1620 518 122 643 
1630 454 108 635 
1698 389 012 578 
1853 325 .99997789 448 
60 
OBSV. WEIBULL 
SURVIVCRS SU?VI~ 
1552648 ·1552645.4 
47 45.3 
46 45.2 
45 45.1 
44 44.7 
43 44.6 
42 44.4 
41 43.4 
40 43.2 
39 43 
38 42.6 
37 41. 4 
36 40.7 
35 39.4 
34 34.2 
33 32.7 
32 32.5 
31 32.3 
30 30.4 
29 29.5 
28 27.8 
27 27.1 
26 19.8 
25 19.6 
24 18.1 
23 14.6 
EXPONENTI.~L 
SURVIVORS 
1552645.2 
45.1 
45.1 
45 
44.6 
44.5 
44.4 
43.6 
43.5 
43.3 
42.9 
42 
41.5 
40.6 
36.9 
36 
35.8 
35.7 
34.4 
33.8 
32.8 
32.3 
27.9 
27.8 
26.9 
24.9 
~ 
. 
• ~ 
.~ 
... ; 
~ 
i , 
; 
,\ ;.; 
i 
! 
• I 
\ 
I 
I ( 
i 
I 
I 
r 
1 
-- i 
.. , 
J 
~I 
! 
~ I 
t 
l 
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0-5000 III 
FAIL OSSV. WEIBULI. EXPONE~:TI~.L OESV. WEIBULL EXPOSES:-:;'.: Tn-IE REI.r.~3ILITY RELI.h.BILITY RE'LI.~EILITY St:RVIVO;:{S StJRVIVORS Sl..';:{\·!VC!'.S 
295 
299 
306 
341 
352 
3'13 
423 
437 
465 
573 
646 
926 
1000 
1014 
1020 
1117 
1162 
12'77 
1620 
1630 
1698 
1853 
2032 
2065 
2333 
2750 
2799 
2843 
2910 
2971 
3021 
3032 
3055 
3116 
3146 
3426 
3430 
3561 . 
3658 
4015 
4218 
4342 
4545 
4736 
.99999911 
823 
734 
646 
558 
469 
381 
293 
204 
116 
028 
.99998939 
851 
763 
674 
586 
498 
409 
321 
233 
144 
056 
.99998968 
87~ 
791 
703 
610 
526 
438 
349 
261 
173 
084 
.99996996 
908 
819 
731 
643 
554 
466 
378 
289 
201 
113 
.99999691 
687 
680 
644 
633 
612 
562 
548 
521 
4H 
342 
069 
.99998998 
984 
978 
885 
841 
731 
404 
395 
330 
184 
015 
.99997984 
732 
343 
297 
256 
194 
137 
091 
080 
059 
002 
.99996975 
716 
712 
591 
501 
173 
.99995987 
873 
687 
513 
.99999753 
749 
743 
714 
70S 
687 
645 
634 
610 
520 
459 
224 
162 
151 
145 
064 
027 
.99998930 
643 
635 
578 
448 
29R 
271 
0't6 
.99997697 
656 
619 
563 
512 
470 
461 
442 
391 
365 
131 
128 
018 
.99996937 
383 
468 
364 
194 
034 
1131980 
79 
78 
77 
76 
75 
74 
73 
72 
71 
70 
69 
68 
67 
66 
65 
64 
63 
62 
61 
60 
59 
58 
57 
56 
55 
54 
53 
52 
51 
50 
49 
48 
47 
46 
45 
44 
43 
42 
41 
40 
39 
38 
37 
1131977.5 
77.4 
77.3 
76.9 
76.8 
76.6 
76 
75.8 
75.5 
74.3 
73.5 
70.4 
69.6 
69.5 
69.4 
68.3 
67.8 
66.6 
62.9 
62.8 
62.1 
60.4 
58.5 
58.1 
55.3 
50.9 
50.4 
49.9 
49.2 
48.5 
48 
47.9 
47.7 
47 
46.7 
43.8 
43.7 
42.4 
41.4 
37.6 
35.5 
34.2 
32.1 
30.2 
1131978.2 
78.1 
78.1 
77.7 
77.6 
77.4 
76.9 
76.e 
76.5 
75.5 
74.S 
72.2 
71.5 
71 • .; 
71.3 
70.4 
69.9 
68.8 
65.6 
65.5 
64.9 
63.4 
61.7 
61.4 
58.8 
54.9 
54.4 
54 
53.4 
52.8 
52.3 
52.2 
S2 
51.4 
51.1 
48.5 
4e.5 
47.2 
46.3 
42.9 
41 
39.8 
37.9 
36.1 
61 
i 
i 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
.1 
~l 
I 
i 
. -. 0-10000 III 
FAIL OBSV. HEIBULL EXPONENTIAL 
Tn.:E RE:LV.EILITY RE:LI J..B ILITY RELI.~.3IL!7Y 
295 .99999810 .99999545 .99999804 
299 621 540 802 
341 432 486 774 
423 "2..43 383 719 
437 054 366 710 
646 .99998864 118 572 
952 675 .99998777 369 
1020 486 703 324 
1117 297 600 260 
1277 108 432 154 
1620 .99997918 083 .99998927 
1630 729 073 920 
1698 540 006 875 
1853 351 .99997853 773 
2065 162 647 632 
2729 .99996973 022 192 
2730 838 021 192 
2786 594 .99996970 155 
2843 405 917 117 
3021 216 755 .99997999 
3032 027 745 992 
3149 .99995837 639 914 
3426 648 391 731 
3430 459 387 728 
4218 270 .99995698 207 
4342 081 591 124 
4736 .99994891 255 .99996864 
5405 702 .99994695 421 
6269 513 .99993987 .99995849 
7444 324 047 071 
7709 135 .99992838 .99994895 
8645 .99993946 110 275 
9542 756 .99991424 .99993681 
9610 567 372 636 
9659 378 335 604 
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OBSV. WEIBULL 
StTRVIVORS SURV!VC~S 
528576 528574.5 
75 74.5 
74 74.2 
73 73.7 
72 73.6 
71 72.3 
70 70.5 
69 70.1 
68 69.6 
67 68.7 
66 66.8 
65 66.8 
64 66.4 
63 65.6 
62 64.5 
61 61.2 
60 61.2 
59 60.9 
58 60.7 
57 59.8 
56 59.7 
55 59.2 
54 57.9 
53 57.9 
52 54.2 
51 53.6 
50 51.9 
49 48.9 
48 45.2 
47 40.2 
46 39.1 
45 35.2 
44 31.6 
43 31.4 
42 31.2 
EXPONEN'!'r;..~ 
St:RVIVO;:';S 
528575.9 
75.9 
75.R 
75.5 
75.4 
74.7 
73.6 
73.4 
73 
72.5 
71.3 
71.2 
71 
70.5 
69.7 
67.4 
67.4 
67.2 
67 
66.4 
66.3 
65.9 
65 
65 
62.2 
61.8 
60.4 
58.1 
55 
50.9 
50.0 
46.7 
43.6 
43.3 
43.1 
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APPENDIX C. 2 Proportion Br'eakq.own' of Micro-
circuit Types by Vendor 
The 18 microcircuit types that were previously analyzed for pdfs of 
time' to failure and which determined a study pop~lation of 1552649 
relate to the vendor as follows: 
PROPORTION 8R~AKDOWN BY VE~DOR 
'Oty of Intermittent P1:oportion of 
P~oportion of and Potentiall y Intermittent'ar::1 VENDOR Intermittent Potentially Population Failures Intermit;tent 
Failures 
, 
.1 .2733 8 .205 
2 .2933 3. .077 
3· 
.3653 2 .051 
4 .04 "0 0 
5 .0166 26 .667 
25 .0075 0 0 
78 .004 0 0 
• 
63 
0\ 
01:>. 
Total Qty Proportion Proportion Failures Failures Failures in ~ of Total by Vendor by Vendor by Vendor Population ropu1ation by Vc~dor 0-2000 hr. 2000-5000 hr. 5000-10000 hr , I , 
Vendor 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
, , 
Hicroc~tcuit 
: 
1 272492 ',' , .1755 .206 .322 .472 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 , 
2 1055481 .6197 .216 .311 .407 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 59011 .038 .546 .316 .018 2 0 9 0 0 10 0 0 1 
4 69646 ! .045 .296 .141 .38b .183 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 J 1 0 1 
, I 
, 
. " 
The remaining 14 part types had no failures of an intermittent and Potentially Intermittent nature 
and made up 6.19% of the population.' 
" 
.•. ---- ----.... --- ....-.-__ .·1 _.~ __ .. _I""''''''''~,;Il.l''''''_~.:;...-''''~~.o'Itr.~~" ..... '''t ... "'lII"'7:~'''''''''''''~.n , •. ~ ""., .... ."..,.." • 
APPENDIX C.3 
\ Quantity of Digital Microcircuits per Chassis 
IC Per Single Total Ie 
Chassis PO!2ulation 
Power supply 7 1372 
Input Output Controller 2544 432480 
Input Output Adapter 246 57737 
Central Processing Unit 3658 588938 
Core Memory 781 412368 
Film Hemory 866 59754 
TOTALS 8102 1552649 
Grid of Microcircuit Failure by Chassis Function 
Potentially 
Intermittent Intermittent 
Power Supply 0 0 
Input Output Controller 14 5 
Input Output Adapter 0 0 
Central Processor Unit 8 1 
Core Memory 6 8 
Film Memory 0 0 
~ard 
0 
15 
13 
13 
11 
12 
65 
~ 
I 
I 
.. I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I j 
! 
i 
i 
I 2. Government Accession No. 1. Report No. 
NASA CR-159268 
4. Title and Subtitle 
Study of Intermittent Field Hardware Failure Data in 
Digital Electronics 
7. Author!s) 
Edward J. O'Neill and James R. Halverson 
9. Performing Organization Name and Address 
Sperry Univac 
Univac Park 
P. O. Box 3525 
St. Paul, Minnesota 55165 
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Washington, DC 20546 
15. Supplementary Notes 
3. Recipient's Catalog No. 
5. Report Date 
June 1980 
6. Performing Organization Code 
8. Performing Organization Report No. 
10. Work Unit No. 
11. Contract or Grant No. 
NASl-15574 
13. Type of Report and Period Covered 
Contractor Report 
14. Sponsoring Agency Code 
NASA Project Engineer, Salvatore Bavuso, Langley Research Center, 
Hampton, Virginia 23665 
16. Abstract 
This study involved the collection and analysis of data concerning intermittent 
failures in digital devices.' The study was made using data from a computer which 
was designed for shipboard·usage. The failure data consisted of actual field failures 
which were classified by failure mechanisms and their likelihood of having been 
intermittent, potentially intermittent, or hard. Each class was studied with 
respect to computer operation in the ranges of 0-2,000 hours, 0-5,000 hours and 
0-10,000 hours. The study was done at the computer level as well as the microcircuit 
level (SSI Technology). 
Results indicate that as age increases, the quasi-intermittent failure rate increases 
and the mean time to failure decreases. 
17. Key Words (Suggested by Author(sll 
Intermittent failures 
Reliability 
Field Failure Data 
19. Security Classif. (of this report) 
Unclassified 
18. Distribution Statement' 
Unclassified - Unlimited 
STAR Category 38 
20. Security Classif. (of this pagel 
Unclassified 
21. No. of Pages 
66 
22. Price· 
N·lOS For sale by the National Technical Information Service. Springfield. Virginia 22161 
End of Document 
